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Executive summary:  The SATA advertised bit error rate of one error in 10 terabytes is fright-
ening.  We moved 2 PB through low-cost hardware and saw five disk read error events, several 
controller failures, and many system reboots caused by security patches. We conclude that SATA 
uncorrectable read errors are not yet a dominant system-fault source – they happen, but are rare 
compared to other problems. We also conclude that UER (uncorrectable error rate) is not the 
relevant metric for our needs. When an uncorrectable read error happens, there are typically 
several damaged storage blocks (and many uncorrectable read errors.) Also, some uncorrect-
able read errors may be masked by the operating system. The more meaningful metric for data 
architects is Mean Time To Data Loss (MTTDL.)  
 
TerraServer and other Internet properties report be-
tween 3% and 7% per year “hard” disk failures re-
quiring drive replacement (see Table 1.)  These num-
bers agree with anecdotes from other sites. For ex-
ample, a failure rate of 8% was observed over 1000 
parts years at the Internet Archive using PATA 
drives.  
 
Significant error rates are also reported for disk con-
trollers and SAN switches (see table 1).   
 
The numbers in Table 1 are ten times the rate ex-
pected from reading the disk vendor specification 
sheets.   This raises the question of whether other 
failure specifications are optimistic.   
   
Disk hardware specs predict an uncorrectable error 
in every 10 TB to 1,000 TB read.   Vendor drive 
specifications predict an uncorrectable bit error rate 
(UER) every 1015 to 1016 bits read for SCSI and 1013 to 
1015 bits read for various PATA and SATA drives. But, 
that is just the drive error rate. Architects must add the 
error rate for the disk controller, the cables, the PCI 
bus, the memory, and the processor, so observed uncor-
rectable bit errors will be more frequent than the drive-
level fault rate. Architects must also recognize that any 
of these errors can be masked by retry or other error 
correction strategies in the controller or operating sys-
tem software 
 
When you consider that the specified drive failure rates 
are more than ten times too optimistic (see Table 1), 
the actual uncorrectable error rate could be even worse 
than this one-in-10TB estimate.  Data pipeline process-
ing, data mining, and backup/restore routinely read tens 
of terabytes per day.  Polling our sources turned up 
very few uncorrectable read errors – in some cases, 
none – so we decided to set up an experiment of our 
own to look for them.       
 
Modern disks, when read sequentially, transfer about 
50MB/s. At that rate, one disk can transfer 1014 bits 
within 4 days.  So, we should be able to measure a 10-14 
bit error rate.   We set up JBOD SATA drives with a 
variety of disks and controllers on four systems (Table 
2). The first system was in an office environment with 
no week-end air conditioning – but the system did have 
adequate fans. In other words, it is typical of small-
office, home-office, and low-budget organizations. The 
remaining systems are rack mounted in an environment 
with full air conditioning. In other words, these sys-
tems are typical of data centers and higher-budget or-
ganizations.  
 
We wrote a program that, for each of the disks, repeat-
edly did the following: 
(1) Write a 10GB file with random data (a different 
pattern each time) computing the 64-bit checksum. 
(2) Read the file computing the checksum. 
(3) Write a trace record indicating the read, write, and 
cpu times, and whether the checksums matched.  
 
We believe that (1) the checksum test detects almost all 
data errors, (2) the Windows Server 2003 event log 
Table 1: Observed failure rates.  
System Source Type Part Years Fails 
Fails 
/Year 
SCSI 10krpm 858 24 2.8% 
controllers 72 2 2.8% TerraServer SAN  Barclay 
san switch 9 1 11.1% 
TerraServer 
Brick  Barclay SATA 7krpm 138 10 7.2% 
SCSI 10krpm 15,805 972 6.0% Web  
Property 1 anon controllers 900 139 15.4% 
PATA 7krpm 22,400 740 3.3% Web  
Property 2 anon motherboard 3,769 66 1.7% 
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signals any unrecoverable bit errors on read, and (3) 
the SMART counters (C7 CRC errors and C8 write 
errors) report errors.   We ran the program on the office 
system from May 2005 to Sept 2005 and started run-
ning the program on the data center systems in August 
2005.  
 
We ran more than 35,000 read-write cycles on the of-
fice system and over 32,000 read-write cycles on the 
data center systems; this corresponds to about six 
months of heavy drive usage on both systems. We 
moved more than 1.3 petabytes or 10 petabits (10+16 
bits) through the IO systems. 
 
After running these tests for 6 months we changed the 
test strategy on System 1. We filled each of its 8 drives 
with a 100GB file.  Then we ran a checksum verifier 
on each of the files in parallel – a cpu-bound task that 
runs at about 30TB per day (420 MB/s).  This test de-
tects “rotten bits” that have decayed since being written 
(the previous tests read bits that had just been written).   
The test looks at bits that are a few months old. Thus 
far, the System 1 read-only test has read 756 TB and 
seen no errors. 
 
These tests moved 2 petabytes and read more than 1.4 
petabytes. If uncorrectable read errors are actually in-
dependent, we would expect to have seen 14 or 140 
uncorrectable read errors depending on the actual UER 
rate. The drive specifications of UER=10-14 suggest we 
should have seen 112 read errors. 
 
To date, we observed four clear read error events and 
one suspected event. Each event had a slightly different 
signature. Each of the clear events was accompanied by 
one or more system error log entries as shown in Fig-
ure 1; there was no system error log entry in the sus-
pected case. In two of the clear events and in the sus-
pected event, the program (and the .NET runtime and 
Windows 2003 operating system) reported a corre-
sponding error stack trace as shown in Figure 1.  
    
Table 2: Configurations of the various test systems used to explore bit error rates.  
Tyan S2882 K8S Motherboard, 2 Ghz Opteron 246, 4 GB RAM (PC 2700 with ECC) 
One each of the following SATA controllers:  3Ware 8400, SuperMicro “Marvell”  MV8, RAIDCORE BC4452, 
Silicon Image SiI 3114 SATAlink 
4 Western Digital 250GB  WD250JD 
4 Maxtor 250 GB               7Y250MO  
System 1 
Office environment  
 
Windows Server 2003 Standard with SP1 (32 bit mode). 
Tyan S2882 K8S Motherboard, 1.8 Ghz Opteron 244, 2 GB RAM (ECC) 
SuperMicro “Marvell”  MV8 
3 Seagate 400GB ST3400832AS 
System 2 
Data center environment  
Windows Server 2003 Standard with SP1 and R2 Beta 2 (32 bit mode). 
Tyan S2882 K8S Motherboard, 1.8 Ghz Opteron 244, 2 GB RAM (ECC) 
SuperMicro “Marvell”  MV8 
3 Seagate 400GB ST3400832AS 
System 3 
Data center environment   
Windows Server 2003 Standard with SP1 (32 bit mode). 
Tyan S2882 K8S Motherboard, 1.8 Ghz Opteron 244, 2 GB RAM (ECC) 
SuperMicro “Marvell”  MV8 
3 Seagate 400GB ST3400832AS 
System 3 
Data center environment   
Windows Server 2003 Standard with SP1 and R2 Beta 2 (32 bit mode). 
Figure 1. Screen shot of system error log entry associated with an 
uncorrectable read error (left) and error stack trace from the program 
receiving the error (below).  
 
System.IO.IOException: Data error (cyclic redundancy check).   
at System.IO. Error.WinIOError(Int32 errorCode, String FullPath) 
at System.IO.FileStream.ReadCore(Byte[ ] buffer, Int32 offset, Int32 n) 
at System.IO.FileStream.Read(Byte[ ] array, Int32 offset, Int32 count) 
at System.IO.BinaryReader.FillBuffer(Int32 numBytes) 
at System.IO.BinaryReader.ReadUInt64() 
at WriteReadChecksum.ReadFile.readFile(String fileName)' 
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In the suspected case, the program reported an error but 
there were no system error log entries. At about the 
same time, a write error occurred on another disk at-
tached to the same controller. Shortly after, the system 
crashed. The write error is likely due to a controller 
problem – the write failed because the disk was no 
longer present. Unfortunately, in this case, the system 
error log was lost due to corruption. We don’t know 
whether the block mode read error was actually a block 
mode read error or whether the disk controller got con-
fused and returned a questionable status code.  
 
In two of the clear events, the program reported an er-
ror and there were bad block entries in the system error 
log. In one event, there were 14 error log entries with 6 
different disk addresses recorded over a minute. In the 
other event, there were 10 error log entries with 3 dif-
ferent disk addresses recorded over less than a minute. 
The multiple entries are an artifact of how our 1 MB 
request is processed by Windows. Each 1 MB read 
request is broken into sixteen 64KB requests and 
queued to the disk by the operating system. When the 
file system receives a bad block error on a read, the 
read is retried 4 times. If the retries fail, the full request 
is then canceled. The error log entries are the result of 
different blocks being retried while other blocks also 
encounter errors before all other requests are cancelled.  
 
In the other two clear events, there were bad block en-
tries in the system error log but the program continued 
to run and reported no error. In these events, a single 
bad block entry was logged. The disk extent was suc-
cessfully accessed when the file system retried the read 
– so the read error was masked by the OS retry mecha-
nism. No error was seen by the .NET runtime or pro-
gram. One of these events was accompanied by con-
troller timeouts and occurred during patch download-
ing and application.  
 
From the point of view of the programmer, we have 
seen 3 uncorrectable read errors. From the point of 
view of the operating system and the disk drive, there 
have been 30 uncorrectable read errors. There are actu-
ally at least 12 disk extents which encountered errors 
that were unrecoverable by the disk; 3 of these re-
mained unreadable after four retries by the file system 
and imply data loss.  
 
We conclude from this is that the uncorrectable read 
error rate as quoted by the disk manufacturers is not 
very useful in practice. A better metric would be mean 
time to data loss. We observed 3 loss events while 
reading 1.4 PB, This is 3 lost files. In the datacenter 
environment we lost 2 of 32,000 10GB files,  In the 
office setting (System 1) we lost one 10GB file in 
35,000 tries, and no 100GB files in 7,560 tries. 
Read errors were not the dominant source of system 
outages. We experienced at least 4 controller firmware 
or driver errors – usually associated with a subsequent 
system crash or hang.  Each system was updated and 
rebooted monthly for security patches. System version 
updates also caused some outages. A file system cor-
ruption and a disk timeout causing it to go offline co-
occurred with some of these installs.   
 
These system restarts did not cause data loss – just ser-
vice interruption. The only data loss was the 3 uncor-
rectable read errors mentioned above and the corrup-
tion and then loss of the System1\C:  system disk. The 
corruption was repaired by the operating system utility 
(chkdisk) and lost binaries were recovered (using the 
Recovery Console). A month later that disk failed 
completely and was replaced.  There were no disk fail-
ures among our test drives (System1\C: was not one of 
the test drives).   So, one could argue that we had data 
loss from one drive failure and from 3 uncorrectable 
read errors.  
 
We continue these experiments; this is just a status 
report.   We also continue to work with Internet-scale 
properties who are tracking their storage failure rates.  
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